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The Head of the Mossad: In Pursuit of a Safe and
Secure Israel. By Shabtai Shavit. Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2020. ISBN
9780268108335. Hardcover. 434 Pages. $29.00.
Reviewed by Nadav Morag, Sam Houston State University
This book consists of the views of Shabtai Shavit, who served as the head
of Israel’s civilian external intelligence agency, Ha Mossad le Modi’in ve
Tafkidim Meuchadim (the institute for intelligence and special duties),
more commonly known as the Mossad (institute). Shavit served as head of
the Mossad between 1989 and 1996, an eventful period in Israel’s history
(though one would be hard-pressed to find any period in Israeli history
that was not eventful) that included the end of the Cold War, peace
negotiations with the Palestinians and the establishment of the Palestinian
Authority, the debut of Palestinian suicide bombing attacks in Israel, and
the first Gulf War. Consequently, there is undoubtedly a great deal of
interesting information and a range of insights that Shavit could convey on
how these momentous events affected Israel and how Israel responded to
them, at least within the context of the Mossad’s role.
A book written by a former Mossad head could be an extremely valuable
addition to the literature, not only on this covert Israeli agency, but on the
manner in which intelligence impacts decision-making in Israel. Such a
book could also provide insights into the nature of intelligence cooperation
between Israeli intelligence and security agencies and between the Mossad
and foreign intelligence agencies. Furthermore, such a book could
contribute to the understanding of the Mossad’s role as Israel’s “secret
foreign ministry” with respect to countries that do not have diplomatic
relations with Israel (particularly those that are technically enemies of the
State of Israel). The problem with Shavit’s book is that it does none of this.
Of course, this type of information is heavily classified and therefore he is
not at liberty to disclose any of this, but, herein lies the rub: Many
thoughtful works by scholars (including those with intelligence
experience) and good journalists have been written on the Mossad
(Melman and Raviv), on the nature of intelligence (Lowenthal, Laquer,
Wirtz, Dahl), and on Israel’s covert relationships with various countries
(Ben-Zvi, Posner, Jones), etc., and thus the added value of a book by a
former Mossad head lies in his experiences and insights with respect to
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sensitive matters he was directly involved with, and yet it is precisely these
matters that he cannot disclose.
Instead, Shavit offers us a broad range of his opinions on various issues
relating to intelligence, the Arab-Israeli conflict, national security,
diplomacy, world events, terrorism, and others. To be fair, Shavit does not
claim that he has produced a scholarly work and he notes that his book
“…does not purport to present scientific research; rather, it conveys the
author’s personal opinions” (p. xix). But it is not clear what the value is of
his personal opinions if he cannot demonstrate their validity through his
actual experiences and it is therefore unclear as to what led him to take
certain positions on certain issues. The literature on intelligence, the ArabIsraeli conflict, national security, covert diplomacy, and related issues is
rich and varied and there is a plethora of scholarly books, articles, and
think tank publications, properly footnoted, that address the issues
covered in Shavit’s book in clearer and more comprehensive ways, with
evidence provided for assertions made.
It is true that Shavit held a very senior role and that he was in a position to
observe, and possibly to influence, policy making at the Prime Ministerial
level, but his views on Israel’s national security and fundamental interests,
at least as expressed in this book, are not unique or particularly insightful.
The fundamental interests of a given country (or at least one that is widely
known and therefore holds interest for scholars, analysts, and journalists)
can be discerned by anyone with the time and patience to do some
reading. There is no magic insight afforded by access to intelligence or
other classified information when one is focused on larger strategic issues
(as opposed to tactical intelligence, which can be incredibly valuable). In
the United States alone, there are over one hundred think tanks and
universities that produce high-quality scholarship and analysis on national
interests, challenges, domestic political considerations, military
capabilities, economic and social issues, etc. relating to many countries,
Israel included.
Shavit recognized the value of this type of strategic analysis in his
establishment of the Mossad’s Research Department, thus, as he notes,
transforming the Mossad from “…an intelligence-gathering and special
operations agency to an intelligence-gathering, special operations, and
research and assessment agency…” (p. 6). However, when he describes
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some of the conclusions reached by this department, or by a team he
established in 1995 (known as Forum 2000) in order to assess threats and
opportunities for Israel in the new century, those conclusions are no
different, and in many cases less sophisticated, than those that can be
found in the better assessments by think tanks and scholars. For example,
recommendations for fighting Jihadi terrorism include:
“improving intelligence gathering, better technology for sampling
airborne agents, tracking the flow of terrorist funds, increasing
cyber capabilities, use of intelligence to build criminal cases,
enhancing intelligence cooperation between national agencies, and
integrating intelligence into combat operations” (pp. 81-82).
There is nothing new or particularly insightful in this list of proposed
measures. Similarly, when considering the potential impact of an Israeli
attack on Iran, Shavit provides a series of issues for Israeli policymakers to
consider such as: Whether Hezbollah will respond to an attack on Iran by
Israel, when the United States should be informed of an imminent attack
on Iran, whether Israel should target only Iran’s nuclear sites, or try to
disrupt the government by attacking government targets, and whether it
might be possible to attack Iran in such a way that allows plausible
deniability (p. 121). Nothing here is new or absent from a range of
analytical works on this issue (including, for example, analysis by Anthony
Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies).
Nevertheless, had Shavit’s work distilled much of this into one organized
and well-substantiated volume, this would have provided a useful service
to those less familiar with these issues. However, Shavit’s objective was to
provide his opinions on various issues, not to create a primer on
intelligence, national security, the Arab-Israeli conflict, covert diplomacy,
or other such issues. Moreover, the book meanders from topic to topic
without any clear attempt to build on information from previous sections
in order to draw conclusions. For example, on one page, the author
discusses the relationship between the Mossad and Israeli law
enforcement and in the next few pages, the author moves on to discussing
the Iranian threat to Israel. There appears to be little organizational logic
in the manner in which topics are introduced and addressed.
In summary, there can be little doubt that Shabtai Shavit possesses a
wealth of experience and insight by virtue of his former key role in the
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Israeli intelligence system. At the same time, he is legally and morally
bound not to divulge national security secrets and thus cannot share these
experiences and insights. Given these constraints, and given his apparent
lack of desire to create a work of evidence-based research (something that
he presumably would have expected from the Mossad’s Research
Department when he headed the agency), he has produced instead a book
of opinions. There may be, perhaps, some residual value in reading the
opinions of a former head of the Mossad as it may demonstrate the
thinking of some in the Israeli security community during a particular
historical period, but I can think of better ways to educate oneself on the
issues addressed in this book.
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